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INTRODUCTION 
At the core of modern regulation of the American legal profession is 
the assumption that lawyers, clients, and regulators are largely individualis-
tic—or autonomous—in how they behave and how they understand their 
self-interest.1 In this Essay, we seek to ground regulation of lawyers in a 
more accurate and beneficial understanding that lawyers, clients, and regu-
lators are largely relational in how they act and how they understand self-
interest. We suggest that a relational approach will result in more effective 
regulation and will also encourage lawyers to rethink their role in represent-
ing clients and in serving as public citizens so that they embrace a more 
expansive understanding of their duties to the public good. 
  
 * Edward & Marilyn Bellet Professor of Legal Ethics, Morality & Religion, Ford-
ham University School of Law. Many thanks to the participants in the Michigan State Uni-
versity College of Law Conference on Lawyers as Conservators for their helpful comments. 
Special thanks to John Flood and Julian Webb for their valuable assistance. We are also very 
appreciative of Ted Schneyer’s wise counsel. 
 ** Charles W. Delaney, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College 
of Law. 
 1. See infra Part II; see, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling 
Case: Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 
68, 70-75 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998) (arguing that the modern regulatory approach as-
sumes and builds upon lawyers’ individualism and clients’ autonomy).  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2625138 
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Given the dominance of the culture of autonomous self-interest, these aspi-
rations may appear quite ambitious, but they are neither unrealistic nor un-
precedented. Indeed, they resemble the traditional understanding of law-
yers’ role and function of attorney regulation.2 Until the 1960s, the assump-
tion underlying lawyer regulation was relational self-interest3 —“the view 
that all actors are inter-connected, whether [as] individuals [or in groups] . . 
. [and] cannot maximize [their] own good in isolation. Rather, maximizing 
the good of the individual or [group] requires consideration of the good of 
the neighbor, the [constituent, community], and of the public.”4 
This relational regulatory approach, in turn, led lawyers to view them-
selves as “civics teachers”5 who served as intermediaries between the peo-
ple and both the law and the public good.6  
But the understandings of the lawyer’s role and the resulting regulato-
ry approach shifted over time to that of autonomous self-interest.7 Lawyers, 
  
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. Although the relational perspective was dominant prior to the 1960s, a signifi-
cant minority of lawyers did embrace autonomous self-interest. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, 
Lawyers As America’s Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original 
Understanding of the Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 392-95 (2001) 
[hereinafter Pearce, America’s Governing Class]; Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of 
Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1988); PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: 
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 99-121 (1965); Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth 
of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1397 (2003). 
 4. Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, Law Practice As a Morally Responsible Business: 
Reintegrating Values into Economics and Law 5 (July 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author), available at http://law2.fordham.edu/calfiles/flscal24523.doc [hereinafter 
Pearce & Wald, Law Practice]. 
 5. Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin at Home”: 
The Lawyer As Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207 (2009); 
see also Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic Culture: 
Confronting the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 
1, 5, 40, 41 (2011) [hereinafter Pearce & Wald, Obligation of Lawyers]. 
 6. See Green & Pearce, supra note 5, at 1212-15; David Luban, Rediscovering 
Fuller’s Legal Ethics, in REDISCOVERING FULLER: ESSAYS ON IMPLICIT LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 193, 199 (Willem J. Witteveen & Wibren van der Burg eds., 1998) 
[hereinafter Luban, Fuller’s Legal Ethics]; Lon L. Fuller & John. D. Randall, Professional 
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958); DAVID LUBAN, 
LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007) [hereinafter LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS]; Pearce, 
America’s Governing Class, supra note 3. Commentators who proposed similar approaches 
included David Hoffman, George Sharswood, Louis D. Brandeis, and Harlan Fiske Stone. 
See Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession As a Blue State: Reflections on Public Philoso-
phy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1346-57 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter Pearce, Legal Profession]. The American Bar Association embraced this perspective in 
the preambles to the American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics, and Code of 
Professional Responsibility. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS pmbl. (1908); MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1969) 
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like others in elite culture, came to view individuals and organizations as 
“‘atomistic actors [who] seek to maximize their own atomistic good.’”8 As a 
result, lawyers’ commitment to the community of lawyers and to the public 
good declined, and lawyer regulation followed suit, focusing over time 
more on aspirations and incentives that assumed and reinforced the notion 
that lawyers and their clients embraced autonomous self-interest. Indeed, 
contemporary ethics rules consist largely of black letter rules that implicitly 
promote the notion that lawyers are neutral partisans,9 also known as hired 
guns—Holmesian bad men (and women) who seek to get away with what 
they can, and to encourage clients to do the same, within the bounds of the 
technical requirements of law and regulations.10  
In recent years, efforts to rethink the regulation of lawyers in a more 
relational context have emerged. In the United States, for example, com-
mentators have suggested and a few states have adopted regulation at the 
firm level.11 In Australia and the United Kingdom, principles-based regula-
tion models aspects of what a more relational system would look like.12 
These efforts represent a growing commitment once again to embrace the 
relational context of lawyers’ work and to design regulatory approaches to 
  
 7. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the prevailing professional ideology 
took for granted that lawyers were public persons owing special duties to the public good. 
See, e.g., Pearce, Legal Profession, supra note 6; Michael Schudson, Public, Private, and 
Professional Lives: The Correspondence of David Dudley Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 191, 201 (1977) (“In the law, until the middle of the nineteenth century, it had 
been taken for granted that the lawyer was a public person.”). After the Civil War, profes-
sional ideology began a long, slow process of narrowing that commitment. See, e.g., Pearce, 
Legal Profession, supra note 6, at 1351; Mark DeWolfe Howe, Book Review, 60 HARV. L. 
REV. 838, 840 (1947) (reviewing 1 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS 
PREDECESSORS, 1819-1947 (1946)) (Lawyers “never knew the old and found all their dreams 
realized in the dedication of their talents to the expanding interests of their clients.”); Eli 
Wald, Loyalty In Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 909, 928-36 (2009) [hereinafter Wald, Loyalty]; Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of 
Law in Time of War: Politics and Professionalism During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001, 2029-39 (2005). 
 8. Pearce & Wald, Law Practice, supra note 4, at 5.  
 9. LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 6, at 27; William H. Simon, The Ideology of 
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29 (1978). 
 10. Pearce & Wald, Obligation of Lawyers, supra note 5, at 18. With the exception 
of a few aspirations, such as those described in a non-binding preamble or the recommenda-
tion that lawyers perform pro bono contained within Rule 6.1, the Rules impose black letter 
requirements upon lawyers. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2011). 
Indeed, the black letter approach of the Rules replaced the American Bar Association Code 
of Professional Responsibility, which included both aspirational Ethical Considerations and 
black letter Disciplinary Rules. And the Code, in turn, replaced the wholly aspirational 
American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W. 
WILLIAM HODES & PETER R. JARVIS, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §§ 1-1 to 1-25 (2012 Supp.).  
 11. See infra Part III.  
 12. See infra Part III. 
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both reflect and sustain this commitment. Building on and extending in-
sights from these efforts, we propose a relational approach to regulating 
lawyers that would change both the process and substance of regulation, as 
well as encourage American lawyers to recommit themselves to the public 
good in their role as civics teachers in their everyday work. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO LAWYER REGULATION 
Until the promulgation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(the “Rules”) in 1983, the approach to lawyer regulation was largely rela-
tional both in terms of the ethical guidelines and the understanding of why 
lawyers would follow those guidelines. The relational nature of society and 
of lawyers made this regulatory vision possible. Lawyers were thought to be 
better than lay people at identifying and pursuing the public good. Their 
highest duty was helping society and individuals live together in a society 
that promoted the public good and rule of law.13 Lawyers would pursue this 
lofty role through their relationships with clients. As advisors and advo-
cates, lawyers explained to clients that pursuing their own self-interest re-
quired them to take into account the good of their neighbors, coworkers, and 
communities.14 Lawyers also fulfilled their leadership role through their 
service as politicians and leaders in both their local communities and on the 
national stage.15 
The first generation of American legal ethics scholars, led by David 
Hoffman and Judge George Sharswood, offered a distinctively relational 
understanding of lawyer’s ethics.16 They viewed lawyers as a governing 
class in a republican society. Their perspectives reflected a view that society 
was not a collection of autonomous individuals, but an “‘organic whole.’”17 
Nonetheless, they recognized the danger that some individuals would focus 
  
 13. See, e.g., ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS pmbl. (1908); MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2011); Pearce, Legal Profession, supra note 6, at 1347-
58. 
 14. See, e.g., ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL 
ORGANIZATION MAN? (1969); Green & Pearce, supra note 5, at 1212-15. 
 15. See, e.g., Green & Pearce, supra note 5, at 1217-20; Stephen Breyer, The Legal 
Profession and Public Service, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403, 404 (2000). 
 16. See Hon. George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics, 32 ANN. REP. 
A.B.A. 7, 9, 30, 54 (1907); DAVID HOFFMAN, Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deport-
ment, in A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION 
GENERALLY 752 (1972); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the 
Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 250 (1992) [hereinafter Pearce, Rediscov-
ering]; Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal Culture, 
38 MD. L. REV. 673, 674 (1979). 
 17. Pearce, Rediscovering, supra note 16, at 250 (quoting William Michael Treanor, 
Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 699 (1985)). 
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on their autonomous self-interest and not the public good, to the detriment 
of society. Building on the insights of the Framers18 and of leading jurists 
like Justice Story and Chancellor Kent,19 they posited that lawyers, as pro-
fessionals, were skilled at perceiving and promoting the public good and 
would ensure that society balanced the interests of individuals with the pub-
lic good.20 In this role, through their political leadership and client counsel-
ing, lawyers would “secure popular acceptance” of the public good and rule 
of law21 by “diffus[ing] sound principles among the people”22 and promote 
justice by “counsel[ing] the ignorant, defend[ing] the weak and oppressed, 
and . . . on all occasions [serving] as the bulwark of private rights against 
the assaults of power.”23 After learning of this world view from American 
lawyers, Alexis De Tocqueville concluded that “[i]n America, . . . lawyers 
consequently form the highest political class, and the most cultivated por-
tion of society.”24  
The relational framework shaped and informed both the creation of 
ethical guidelines and the analysis of how to get lawyers to follow those 
guidelines. Lawyers and clients existed within a web of relationships, both 
within the legal community and the community as a whole.25 With their 
relational perspective, lawyers would understand that they had ethical obli-
gations to the public good and their clients, and that it was in their interest, 
as well as that of clients and society, for them to fulfill both the letter and 
spirit of those obligations. Accordingly, the “accurate and intelligible 
rules”26 of professional conduct were general principles and not detailed 
instructions.27 Regulating lawyers’ behavior through open-ended standards, 
  
 18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 19. MILLER, supra note 3, at 109. 
 20. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J. P. Mayer ed., 
George Lawrence trans., 1969); Pearce, Rediscovering, supra note 16, at 250-58.  
 21. Pearce, Rediscovering, supra note 16, at 255. 
 22. Sharswood, supra note 16, at 54. 
 23. Id. at 53-54.  
 24. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 20, at 270. 
 25. Pearce, Rediscovering, supra note 16, at 260-61. 
 26. Sharswood, supra note 16, at 56. 
 27. Lawyers owed their clients “warm zeal” and “immovable fidelity,” subject to 
lawyers’ obligations to the law, to virtue, and to fellow lawyers. Id. at 78, 117; Pearce, Re-
discovering, supra note 16, at 262-66. For example, the duty of loyalty required lawyers to 
avoid “taking fees of two adversaries,” disclose potential conflicts, and avoid conflicts with 
the lawyer’s own interests that could arise from business transactions with clients. Shars-
wood, supra note 16, at 109-10, 117, 164-65. Without distinguishing between the attorney-
client privilege and the duty of confidentiality, Sharswood explained that under a general 
duty of confidentiality, an attorney was to keep the client’s confidences, even when the law-
yer learned of the criminal defendant’s guilt or of facts damaging to this client’s civil case. 
Id. at 84-85, 104-07; see, e.g., Pearce, Rediscovering, supra note 16, at 262. Competence was 
a matter of “preparation, punctuality, attention to detail, and continuing education.” Pearce, 
Rediscovering, supra note 16, at 262 (citations omitted). 
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as opposed to by bright-line rules, demonstrated confidence in lawyers: con-
fidence that lawyers understood their role in relational terms—to serve cli-
ents consistent with serving the public interest—and confidence that law-
yers would consistently act pursuant to this understanding.28  
This relational perspective similarly informed the explanation of how 
lawyers’ understanding of their role and relationships with clients, col-
leagues, and the public would ensure compliance with high ethical stand-
ards. Sharswood explained that an “invisible hand of reputation” among 
lawyers ensured that professional success was inextricably tied to ethical 
conduct.29 He advised a young lawyer to: 
let business seek the young attorney; and though it may come in slowly, and at in-
tervals, and promise in its character neither fame nor profit, still, if he bears in 
mind that it is an important part of his training that he should understand the busi-
ness he does thoroughly, that he should especially cultivate, in transacting it, habits 
of neatness, accuracy, punctuality, and despatch, candor towards his client, and 
strict honor towards his adversary, it may safely prophesied that his business will 
grow as fast as it is good for him that it should grow.30   
Sharswood observed that “[s]ooner or later, the real public—the busi-
ness men of the community, who have important lawsuits, and are valuable 
clients—endorse the estimate of a man entertained by his associates of the 
Bar, unless indeed there be some glaring defect of popular qualities.”31 Ac-
cordingly, lawyers did not need an ethical code of binding, bright-line rules.  
Admittedly, this relational perspective included elements that we 
would reject today. The conceptions of leading “business men” as “the real 
public” and of lawyers’ superior ability to identify and pursue the public 
good reflect an elitism and paternalism that is inconsistent with modern 
values. Indeed, in a culture where lawyers and business leaders were a small 
group of white men, the relational grounding was an exclusionary one that 
limited entry on the basis of race, gender, and often religion. Moreover, 
what lawyers considered the public interest sometimes coincided with their 
own self-interest as lawyers.32 Nonetheless, as imperfect and limited as it 
  
 28. Cf. supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text (describing the traditional rela-
tional approach to lawyers’ role and regulation). 
 29. Pearce, America’s Governing Class, supra note 3, at 390 (citing Sharswood, 
supra note 16, at 75). 
 30. Sharswood, supra note 16, at 131-32. 
 31. Id. at 75; cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Ted Schneyer, Regulatory Controls on 
Large Law Firms: A Comparative Perspective, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 593, 595-96 (2002) (finding 
that informal methods of discipline are effective on solo or small practitioners who depend 
on their reputation to obtain clients, and exploring the application of informal methods of 
regulation to large law firms). 
 32. See, e.g., JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
IN MODERN AMERICA (1977); Pearce & Wald, Obligation of Lawyers, supra note 5, at 30-31. 
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was, the first generation regulatory approach did reflect and shape a rela-
tional understanding of lawyers’ role. 
The next, second generation of attorney regulation similarly embraced 
the relational approach, although with a lesser degree of trust in individual 
lawyers. In the late nineteenth century, the pervasive belief that the practice 
of law had become a business led to the development of the ideology of 
professionalism in order to protect the distinction between a profession and 
a business.33 Under this new professionalism project, an elite group of law-
yers would work through newly created bar associations to control admis-
sions to practice, promulgate ethical rules, and enforce those rules.34 The 
particular rules were the American Bar Association’s 1908 Canons of Eth-
ics.35 Like Sharswood’s approach, the Canons largely provided “general 
discretionary standards.”36 Indeed, most of the Canons were taken from 
Sharswood’s text.37 
With their foundation in a relational understanding, the Canons articu-
lated a strong obligation of lawyers to the public good. The Preamble to the 
Canons explained that “[t]he future of the Republic, to a great extent de-
pends upon [lawyers’] maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied,” and jus-
tice “cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the 
members of [the legal] profession are such as to merit the approval of all 
just men.”38 With regard to role, the Canons expressly rejected the assertion 
“that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed 
in winning his client’s cause.”39 While zealously representing the client, the 
lawyer must act within “the bounds of the law” and without participating in 
“any manner of fraud or chicane.”40 The Canons advised that a lawyer “must 
obey his own conscience and not that of his client.”41 Indeed, a lawyer was a 
“minister[]” of the law who “advance[d] the honor of his profession and the 
best interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to 
  
 33. Pearce, America’s Governing Class, supra note 3, at 399-401; see also Robert 
Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies of New York City Lawyers, 1870-
1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 61 (Gerald W. 
Gawalt ed., Greenwood 1984); AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 33; RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 158 (Alfred A. Knopf 1955). 
 34. Pearce, America’s Governing Class, supra note 3, at 399-400. 
 35. Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 33 ANN. REP. 
A.B.A. 567, 575 (1908). See generally Pearce, Rediscovering, supra note 16, at 241 n.7; 
Pearce, America’s Governing Class, supra note 3, at 400; James M. Altman, Considering the 
A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395 (2003); Gordon, The Independ-
ence of Lawyers, supra note 3, at 13. 
 36. Pearce, Rediscovering, supra note 16, at 270.  
 37. Id. at 243-45, 267-70.  
 38. ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS pmbl. (1908). 
 39. Id. Canon 15. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the 
strictest principles of moral law.”42 The Canons concluded that “above all a 
lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to 
private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loy-
al citizen.”43 
The second generation regulatory approach retained a relational 
framework, but to a lesser extent than the first generation. The basis for trust 
in lawyers’ capacity to pursue the public good narrowed from the virtue of 
lawyers to the experience of lawyers. The duty to the public good itself nar-
rowed. The antebellum responsibility to identify and pursue the good of 
society shifted to a less ambitious, but still relational, duty to “balanc[e] the 
competing interests of rich and poor in order to maintain a fair and stable 
social order.”44 Similarly, with a lesser degree of confidence in the power of 
informal relational culture to ensure the ethical conduct of individual law-
yers, professionalism drew on a formal set of specific rules that bar associa-
tions would articulate and enforce.45 
Nonetheless, the Canons themselves remained, at least in principle, 
aspirational and non-binding. The second generation continued to trust that 
the invisible hand of reputation would provide for enforcement in everyday 
practice. As the Canons explained, “[t]he most worthy and effective adver-
tisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother 
lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional 
capacity and fidelity to trust.”46  
The third generation of legal ethics regulations further reduced the re-
liance on relational culture but did not abandon it altogether. In 1969, the 
ABA replaced the Canons with the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.47 The Code’s Preamble continued to articulate a relational connection 
to the public good. It explained that “[l]awyers, as guardians of the law, 
play a vital role in the preservation of society” and “[t]he continued exist-
ence of a free and democratic society.”48 To “fulfill[] this role,” lawyers 
must “understand[] . . . their relationship with and function in our legal sys-
tem.”49 The Preamble recognized the powerful role of relationships within 
the bar and the larger society in enforcing ethical standards. It explained 
that: 
  
 42. Id. Canon 32. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Pearce, Legal Profession, supra note 6, at 1357. 
 45. Id. at 1356.  
 46. ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (1908); see also Hazard, Jr. & 
Schneyer, supra note 31, at 595-96. 
 47. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969). 
 48. Id. pmbl. 
 49. Id. 
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in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of 
his profession and of the society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer 
the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss 
of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction.50 
At the same time, the Code’s drafters no longer had the same confi-
dence in the invisible hand of reputation. The Code acknowledged “changed 
conditions”51 in the market for legal services. As the Code explained, “For-
merly a potential client usually knew the reputations of local lawyers for 
competency and integrity and therefore could select a practitioner in whom 
he had confidence.”52 The “changed conditions” had “seriously restricted 
the effectiveness of the traditional selection process. Often the reputations 
of lawyers are not sufficiently known to enable laymen to make intelligence 
choices.”53 As a result, the invisible hand of reputation could not work ef-
fectively. 
This changed understanding influenced the construction of the rules. 
While the content of the rules largely tracked those of the first and second 
generation, the Code was a bit more specific.54 Moreover, the Code was the 
first lawyer regulation to include binding rules.55Alongside aspirational Eth-
ical Considerations that reflected a continuing faith in the relational com-
mitments of lawyers, the Code provided Disciplinary Rules that were bind-
ing and enforceable. Nonetheless, the Code described these Disciplinary 
Rules as only the floor for the lawyer’s ethical responsibilities, with the 
Ethical Considerations providing the higher aspiration.56 The evolution of 
the regulatory approach to law practice, from Hoffman-Sharswood’s infor-
mal apparatus to the more formal 1908 Canons and 1969 Code, thus reveals 
a clear trend: a gradual move from a relational approach to understanding 
lawyers’ role and rules to a more individualistic and autonomous one; and a 
corresponding shift from reliance on open-ended standards and aspirations 
to more bright-line rules restraining lawyers’ pursuit of their clients’ narrow 
interests and of their own self-interest at the expense of the legal system and 
the public good.  
II. THE INDIVIDUALISTIC BASIS OF MODERN LAWYER REGULATION 
In contrast to the first three generations of lawyer regulation, the 
fourth generation largely, although not entirely, reflected and reinforced an 
autonomously self-interested understanding of lawyers and their clients.   
  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at EC 2-7. 
 52. Id. at EC 2-6. 
 53. Id. at EC 2-7. 
 54. See Pearce, Rediscovering, supra note 16, at 272-76. 
 55. See HAZARD, JR., HODES & JARVIS, supra note 10, §§ 1.1, 1.11. 
 56. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1969). 
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By the 1980s, the dominant understanding of the lawyer’s role had 
shifted from a relational approach to an autonomous one. As we have writ-
ten elsewhere, “Prior to the 1960s, the relational approach was dominant 
although not the exclusive professional account.”57 The republican under-
standing of lawyers as the governing class,58 the professionalism conception 
of “guardians of the law,”59 and the notion of the lawyer as civics teacher,60 
all presupposed a relational society where lawyers and their clients consid-
ered the interests of their families, neighbors, colleagues, and customers, as 
well as the public good.61 As late as 1963, for example, Erwin Smigel sur-
veyed Wall Street lawyers and found that they considered themselves pri-
marily “guardians of the law” who counseled their clients on not only the 
letter of the law, but also the spirit of the law and the public good.62  
In 1985, Robert A. Kagan, Robert Eli Rosen, and Robert L. Nelson 
conducted surveys that sought to replicate Smigel’s work. They discovered 
that big firm lawyers had changed their perspective and now considered 
themselves neutral partisans—or hired guns.63 The newly dominant concep-
tion described both the lawyer and client as autonomous.64 Clients generally 
pursued their autonomous self-interest with increasingly less regard to inter-
ests of others and of the community.65 Lawyers served as extreme partisans 
for clients’ autonomous self-interest with declining regard to the interests of 
others or of the public good.66 Understanding lawyer and client as autono-
mously self-interested actors, the dominant approach to the lawyer’s role 
disfavored counseling clients on the implications for others or the public 
good because to do so would be to impose the lawyer’s values on the cli-
  
 57. Pearce & Wald, Obligation of Lawyers, supra note 5, at 26. 
 58. Pearce, America’s Governing Class, supra note 3, at 392. 
 59. Id. at 381 (citing ERWIN SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL 
ORGANIZATION MAN? (1963)); see also ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS pmbl. (1908). 
 60. Green & Pearce, supra note 5, at 5. 
 61. Pearce & Wald, Obligation of Lawyers, supra note 5, at 28-30. 
 62. See SMIGEL, supra note 59, at 8-10. 
 63. See generally Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance 
of Large Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985); Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, 
Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large 
Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985). See Pearce, America’s Governing Class, supra note 
3, at 1, 407-10. 
 64. Pearce & Wald, Obligation of Lawyers, supra note 5, at 28-30. 
 65. See id. at 28.  
 66. Id. at 28-30; see Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of 
Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 672-75 (1978); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral 
Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
613, 617; Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER: 
LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 150-71 (David Luban ed., 1984); Russell G. Pearce, 
Professional Responsibility for the Age of Obama, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1594, 1600 
(2009) [hereinafter Pearce, Age of Obama]; Wald, Loyalty, supra note 7, at 28-36.  
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ent’s autonomous self-interest.67 Both lawyer and client had become 
Holmesian bad men (and women) seeking to get away with what they could 
within the letter of the law.68 
Describing this shift, Chief Justice Burger declared a crisis of profes-
sionalism.69 Leaders of the bar and the academy joined him in proclaiming 
that lawyers no longer fulfilled their obligation to the public good that pro-
fessionalism required and had become self-interested business people. They 
went so far as to assert “that lawyers, their ethics, and their professionalism 
are ‘lost,’ ‘betrayed,’ in ‘decline,’ in ‘crisis,’ facing ‘demise,’ near ‘death,’ 
and in need of ‘redemption.’”70 
As lawyers’ conception of their professional role shifted, the Ameri-
can Bar Association adopted the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, which have been adopted since in almost every jurisdiction.71 Both the 
content of the Rules and their form assume and reinforce the autonomous 
conception of the lawyer. The Rules did not erase all relational considera-
tions. For example, they promoted a pro bono obligation,72 continued a 
commitment to the public good in the Preamble,73 permitted lawyers to 
counsel on moral questions,74 and created rules intended to permit lawyers 
to serve as intermediaries.75  
None of these rules, however, successfully promoted a relational un-
derstanding. Even though the Preamble to the Rules acknowledged the duty 
of lawyers as “public citizen[s],” it actually diminished the scope of law-
yers’ obligation to the public good.76 It was the first Preamble to an ethics 
code to place representation of clients before representation of the public 
good, and it devoted far less of its text to that public duty. The few rules that 
promoted relational values were not particularly significant. Rule 2.2 per-
  
 67. Pearce & Wald, Obligation of Lawyers, supra note 5, at 28-30. See also Pearce, 
Age of Obama, supra note 66, at 1600; see LUBAN, Fuller’s Legal Ethics, supra note 6, at 9-
11. In Kate Kruse’s terms, lawyers treated clients as “cardboard clients,” imputing to clients 
the desire to aggressively and narrowly pursue their autonomous self-interest. Katherine R. 
Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103 (2009). 
Kruse herself, however, has nonetheless expressed skepticism regarding moral counseling. 
Id. 
 68. Pearce & Wald, Obligations of Lawyers, supra note 5, at 28-30. 
 69. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1229, 1237 n.35, 1254-55 (1995). 
 70. Id. at 1257 (citations omitted). 
 71. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2011). See generally HAZARD, 
JR., HODES & JARVIS, supra note 10. 
 72. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2011). 
 73. Id. pmbl. 
 74. Id. R. 2.1. 
 75. Id. R. 2.4; ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (PRE-2002), LEGAL INFO. 
INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/aba/2001/ABA_CODE.HTM#Rule2.2 (last visited 
May 30, 2012). 
 76. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2011). 
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mitting lawyers to serve as intermediaries proved unappealing to lawyers 
and the ABA repealed it.77 The pro bono and counseling rules, in contrast to 
almost every other rule, were merely aspirational.78 Not surprisingly, despite 
extensive rhetoric, most lawyers provide little or no pro bono services.79 
More important, though, the Rules created a framework that legitimat-
ed and encouraged lawyers to pursue the dominant conception of the neutral 
partisan. They removed the strongest relational language from the Pream-
ble80 and prescribed numerous discretionary duties81 that permitted lawyers 
to apply their autonomous perspective. Indeed, given the newly dominant 
understanding of lawyers as neutral partisans, lawyers exercised discretion 
in accordance with their conception of themselves and their clients as 
Holmesian bad men and women.  
As a result, authorities and commentators have read the Rules to pre-
scribe the dominant conception. For example, without even mentioning 
Rule 2.1, which expressly permitted lawyers to counsel clients on moral 
issues, the Tennessee Supreme Court Board of Professional Responsibility 
held that lawyers should not engage in moral counseling of clients.82 Com-
mentators reached a similar result. Thomas Shaffer described the Rules as 
embodying an “ethic[] of radical individualism”83 that required lawyers to 
serve as neutral partisans.84 David Luban, Stephen Ellman, and Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr. ascribed to the Rules the notion of the lawyer as hired gun 
grounded in Lord Brougham’s famous “credo” that “‘[a]n advocate, in the 
  
 77. For a discussion of the history and limitations of Rule 2.2, see Russell G. Pearce, 
Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Representing Spouses, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1264-66 (1994); John R. Price, In Honor of Professor John Gau-
batz: The Fundamentals of Ethically Representing Multiple Clients in Estate Planning, 62 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 735, 748 n.69 (2008).  
 78. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 2.1, R. 6.1 (2011).  
 79. See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Profits and Professionalism, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
49, 62-64 & 62 n.63 (2005). 
 80. See supra notes 38, 48-50 and accompanying text.  
 81. Pearce, Rediscovering, supra note 16, at 272-75 (describing the discretionary 
provisions of the Rules).   
 82. See Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., Formal Ethics 
Op. 96-F-140 (1996), available at http://www.tbpr.org/Attorneys/EthicsOpinions/def 
ault.aspx; see Pearce, Legal Profession, supra note 6, at 1341-42; Teresa Stanton Collett, 
Professional Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointments in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 635, 642-43 (1997); Martha Minow, On Being a Religious Professional: The 
Religious Turn in Professional Ethics, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 661, 681-82 (2001); Russell G. 
Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal Democracy: A Challenge and 
an Invitation, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 127, 143-45 (2004). 
 83. Thomas Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 
963, 965 (1986-87).  
 84. Thomas Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. 
L. REV. 697, 697 (1988). 
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discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person 
is his client.’”85  
At the same time, the Rules employed a command and control model 
of regulation that reinforced the notion that lawyers were autonomously 
self-interested.86 While the Code had provided Ethical Considerations and 
explained that the Disciplinary Rules were only a floor for ethical obliga-
tion, the Rules, with few exceptions,87 provided binding requirements. In 
doing so, the Rules both assumed and lent credibility to the belief that law-
yers were autonomously self-interested with little relational influence to 
promote compliance with ethical norms absent enforceable ethical dictates. 
If the Rules assumed lawyers were Holmesian bad men (and women), then 
lawyers could—quite properly—come to view the Rules from the prism of 
whatever they could get away with within the bounds of the law.88 The rela-
tionship between regulatory strategy and lawyers’ self-conception was mu-
tually reinforcing. By promulgating regulations that treated lawyers as 
Holmesian bad men and women, the bar normalized and constituted law-
yers’ beliefs that they should behave as Holmesian bad men and women. 
Indeed, what lawyers could get away with within the bounds of the Rules 
became the measure of a satisfactory professional life.  
The assumption of autonomously self-interested lawyers also had a 
further dimension—it influenced the substance of the Rules regulating the 
lawyer-client relationship. When lawyer and client are both autonomous, the 
goal of communication between them is notification and not dialogue. As 
Eli Wald has explained, “the communications regime orchestrated by the 
Rules, while purporting to be client-centered . . . in fact . . . create[s] a one-
way street,” channeling information from clients to lawyers, but not encour-
  
 85. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 54, 393 (1988) (quot-
ing 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 2012). See generally Stephen Ellman, 
Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of 
Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244 (1991). 
 86. See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text for discussion of command and 
control rules. 
 87. See, e.g., supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of pro bono 
and counseling. 
 88. Cf. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Princi-
ples-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. 
REV. 1411, 1423 (2007) (“[R]ules can be blueprints for evading their underlying purposes. 
Bright lines and exceptions to exceptions facilitate strategic evasion, allowing artful dodging 
of a rule’s spirit by literal compliance with its technical letter.”); Julian Webb, Lawyering in 
Liquid Times: Values and Professionalism in an Age of Uncertainty, Fourth International 
Legal Ethics Conference (July 2010) (on file with authors) (“Rules can weaken aspects of 
moral identity. They stop you having to think about the right solution; they can encourage 
creative compliance, and they may do little to discourage floating responsibility.”). See 
Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 GONZAGA L. REV. 393 
(1990); Julian Webb & Donald Nicolson, Institutionalising Trust: Ethics and Responsive 
Regulation of the Legal Profession, 2 LEGAL ETHICS 148 (1999). 
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aging a meaningful dialogue.89 The Rules, for example, define “informed 
consent” as the client’s “agreement . . . to a proposed course of conduct 
after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation.”90 
A Miranda warning type communication between two autonomous individ-
uals, without dialogue, suffices to satisfy this standard, which governs 
communications regarding conflicts of interest, whether conflicts between 
current clients,91 or between current and former clients,92 or conflicts be-
tween attorney and client, including “business transaction[s]” with clients. 93 
Similarly, the specific Rule regarding communication and candor only re-
quires a lawyer to provide information.94 Rule 1.4 regulating “communica-
tion” requires a lawyer to “promptly inform,” “reasonably consult,” “keep 
the client reasonably informed,” “promptly comply with reasonable requests 
for information,” and “explain.”95 All these terms mandate notification, not 
dialogue. Moreover, Wald notes that Rule 1.4 limits such information to the 
particular situations that Rule 1.4 lists and to information that is “reasonably 
necessary.”96 Wald explains that these provisions, in contrast to an open-
standard mandating communication of all “material” information, create a 
“‘Say as Little as Necessary’ Regime.”97 
This same regime extends to the allocation of authority between law-
yer and client, as well as to the confidentiality exceptions.98 Rule 1.2 re-
quires a lawyer to “abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives 
of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, [to] consult with the client as 
to the means by which they are to be pursued.”99 While the text of the Rule 
expressly limits the lawyer’s duty to consult regarding means to the re-
quirements of Rule 1.4, the Comment to Rule 1.2 similarly limits the duty to 
communicate regarding the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representations.100 Rule 1.2, therefore, requires only notification, and not 
dialogue, regarding the making of decisions in the lawyer-client relation-
ship.  
The Rules that permit disclosure of confidential client information 
similarly do not encourage dialogue. Rule 1.6(a) makes “information relat-
  
 89. Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and Therefore Clients) 
Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 750 (2008) [hereinafter Wald, Attorney-Client Communica-
tions]. 
 90. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.0(b), (e) (2011).  
 91. Id. R. 1.7(b)(4).  
 92. Id. R. 1.9(a). 
 93. See id. R. 1.8(a).  
 94. See id. R. 1.4. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Wald, Attorney-Client Communications, supra note 89, at 759-66. 
 97. Id. at 759. 
 98. See id. at 757. 
 99. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2011). 
 100. Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 1. 
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ing to the representation” confidential, with general exceptions for “in-
formed consent” or disclosures that are “impliedly authorized in order to 
carry out the representation,” as well as for specific exceptions listed in 
Rule 1.6(b).101 The goal of Rule 1.6 is to encourage clients “to communicate 
fully and frankly.”102 Nonetheless, this communication is once again limited 
to providing information, and not dialogue. The first general exception, 
where the client provides “informed consent,” only creates a notification 
requirement.103 The second general exception, where client consent is im-
plied, requires no discussion whatsoever.104 Similarly, Rule 1.6(b), which 
lists circumstances where a lawyer has discretion to reveal confidential in-
formation, does not require dialogue before disclosure.105 Instead, the Com-
ment to the Rule only recommends that “[w]here practicable, the lawyer 
should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the 
need for disclosure.”106 The approach to required lawyer disclosure of false 
evidence or testimony under Rule 3.3 is similar. Rule 3.3 urges that the 
“lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be 
offered”107 or “remonstrate with the client,”108 not engage in a dialogue. 
Last, the way that the Rules approached enforcement of its provisions 
further manifested an understanding of lawyers as autonomous actors. From 
the first generation of legal ethics regulation to the fourth, the legal work-
place had evolved. While the vast majority of lawyers had once worked as 
solo practitioners or in small firms, the modern reality was that a growing 
majority worked in medium to large law firms or other organizations.109 
  
 101. Id. R. 1.6(a). 
 102. Id. R. 1.6 cmt 2. 
 103. See supra text accompanying notes 89-97. 
 104. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 5 (2011). 
 105. Id. R. 1.6(b). 
 106. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 14. For more extensive discussion of how the confidentiality rules 
do not promote dialogue, see Elisia M. Klinka & Russell G. Pearce, Confidentiality Ex-
plained: The Dialogue Approach to Discussing Confidentiality with Clients, 48 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 157 (2011). See also Wald, Attorney-Client Communication, supra note 89. 
 107. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 6 (2011). 
 108. Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 10. 
 109. Ted Schneyer has noted that “[w]hile as late as 1951, sixty percent of the bar 
practiced alone, two-thirds now work in law firms and other organizations.” Ted Schneyer, 
Professional Discipline for Lawyers, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, 
Professional Discipline] (citing RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 179, 300 (1989) and 
BARBARA A. CURRAN ET AL., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF 
THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980S 13 (1985)). From 2010 to 2011, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics found that only “[a]pproximately 26 percent of lawyers were self-employed” 
and that number over-states the number of lawyers in solo practice because it also includes 
partners in law firms. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL 
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 259 (2010). Most of the remainder were “salaried lawyers [who] held 
positions in government, in law firms or other corporations, or in nonprofit organizations.” 
Id.   
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These realities notwithstanding, with the exception of a few rules that con-
sidered the obligations of individual lawyers who worked as supervisors110 
(or that did not impute the conflicts of individual lawyers to a firm in lim-
ited circumstances),111 the vast majority of the Rules did not account for the 
fact that lawyers increasingly worked in organizations. Most glaringly, the 
Rules did not impose ethical duties and sanctions upon law firms, even 
though very few jurisdictions later decided to do so.112 Put differently, by 
ignoring practice realities in which lawyers increasingly practice with oth-
ers, the Rules in fact encourage attorneys to think of themselves as autono-
mous individuals rather than as relational members of organizations. 
In all these ways, the Rules’ embrace of the understanding that law-
yers and clients are autonomous actors has undermined regulatory efforts in 
a number of significant ways. First, this perspective blocks the development 
of a culture that supports compliance. Lawyers who believe that they are 
autonomously self-interested will view rules instrumentally and think that 
they should properly behave as Holmesian bad men and women who try to 
get away with what they can within the bounds of regulations. Second, 
without a culture that promotes obedience to the Rules as a good in itself, 
compliance becomes dependent upon actual enforcement and fear of en-
forcement, and that becomes expensive and inefficient. Unfortunately, dis-
ciplinary committees for the most part only have very limited resources and 
therefore focus largely on violations of the ethics rules that are also subject 
to civil or criminal penalties, such as negligence, crimes, or frauds.113 They 
generally do not enforce independent violations of the Rules,114 and they 
leave most enforcement of the conflict rules to motions to disqualify and 
malpractice insurers.115 Third, disciplinary authorities employ reactive and 
not proactive strategies. Enforcement is ex post and relies upon complaints 
of disciplinary violations.116 Theoretically, of course, even in a command-
and-control system, regulators could employ proactive strategies. Nonethe-
  
 110. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 5.1, 5.2 (2011). 
 111. See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(k), 1.10, 1.11. 
 112. See, e.g., N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5.1(a) (2010), available at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/apprpc.htm; N.Y. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
5.1(a) (2009), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ForAttorneys/ 
ProfessionalStandardsforAttorneys/NYRulesofProfessionalConduct4109.pdf. 
 113. See, e.g., Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 109, at 7. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 72 (1996) (discussing disqualification); Susan P. Shapiro, Bush-
wacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 
LAW. & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 129 (2003) (discussing malpractice insurers); David L. Wilkins, 
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 826-27 (1992) [hereinafter Wil-
kins, Who Should Regulate] (discussing the absence of discipline); Developments in the Law: 
Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1285 (1981). 
 116. See, e.g., Wilkins, Who Should Regulate, supra note 115, at 805-06. 
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less, because proactive regulation requires relational interactions between 
the regulators and the regulated, autonomous perspectives weigh in favor of 
reactive discipline.  
III. EFFORTS TO REINVIGORATE THE RELATIONAL DIMENSION OF LAWYER 
REGULATION 
Two recent developments indicate a possible trend toward moving 
lawyer regulation in a more relational direction. First, United States com-
mentators have urged that the Rules focus on discipline at the firm level in 
addition to the traditional emphasis on the conduct of individual attorneys. 
Second, in Australia and the United Kingdom, regulators have replaced 
command-and-control models with principles-based approaches. While 
these approaches represent a significant advance, they are still vulnerable to 
the continued dominance of an autonomous culture among lawyers.  
As with many innovative legal ethics ideas, the initiator of the pro-
posal for law firm regulation was Ted Schneyer.117 In 1991, Schneyer noted 
that from the 1950s to the 1980s, law practice had shifted from “sixty per-
cent” of lawyers practicing in solo practice to “two-thirds . . . work[ing] in 
law firms and other organizations.”118 He offered three arguments for regu-
lation at the level of law firms:  
First, even when a firm has clearly committed wrongdoing, courts may have diffi-
culty, as an evidentiary matter, in assigning blame to particular lawyers. . . .   
. . .  
Second, even when courts and disciplinary agencies can link professional miscon-
duct to one or more lawyers in a firm as an evidentiary matter, they may be reluc-
tant to sanction those lawyers for fear of making them scapegoats for others in the 
firm who would have taken the same actions in order to further the firm’s interests.  
. . . 
Third, and most important, a law firm’s organization, policies, and operating pro-
cedures constitute an “ethical infrastructure” that cuts across particular lawyers and 
tasks.119  
These arguments are relational in the sense that they recognize that 
many lawyers do not practice as individuals, and meaningfully interact with 
  
 117. Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 109. See generally Ted Schneyer, 
A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the “Ethical Infrastructure” of 
Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245 (1998). See also, e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel, Ethics: Be-
yond the Rules—Questions and Possible Responses, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 875, 878 (1998); 
How Should We Regulate Large Law Firms? Is a Law Firm Disciplinary Rule the Answer?, 
16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203 (2002) [hereinafter How Should We Regulate]; Collective 
Sanctions and Large Firm Discipline, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2336 (2005). 
 118. Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 109, at 4. 
 119. Id. at 8-10. 
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other attorneys in ways that impact their professional conduct. Schneyer 
made a further relational point. Viewing the lawyer-client relationship and 
the law firm as having relational characteristics, he suggested that focusing 
only on the reactive dimension of these relationships through a disciplinary 
system that responds to complaints would be less effective than enforce-
ment through proactive monitoring, in addition to reactive efforts.120 In ex-
plaining the ineffectiveness of the Rules prescribing discipline for supervi-
sory failures, he referred both to the three reasons described above, as well 
as the reactive nature of law firm discipline, and noted that accordingly, 
complaints under these rules were “rare indeed.”121 
A few commentators responded to Schneyer’s proposal with condem-
nation. Some commentators argued that the autonomous approach to lawyer 
regulation was sufficient.122 Others described the locus of ethical responsi-
bility as the autonomous individual and argued that firm liability “may actu-
ally undermine individual ethical incentives rather than furthering attorney 
accountability”123 or that firm liability would unfairly penalize individuals 
who are not directly culpable.124  
Elizabeth Chambliss and David Wilkins, on the other hand, joined 
Schneyer in supporting law firm discipline.125 But they argued that firm reg-
ulation required “that all law firms, regardless of size, be required to desig-
nate one or more partners to be responsible for monitoring the quality of the 
firm’s ethical infrastructure.”126 While acknowledging the powerful, rela-
tional influence of a law firm’s culture,127 Chambliss and Wilkins also relied 
on the assumption of autonomous self-interest in asserting that individual 
  
 120. Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How “Professional Self-Regulation” 
Should Promote Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 577, 619-28 (2011) [hereinafter Schneyer, On Further Reflection]. 
 121. Id. at 603.  
 122. See, e.g., Testimony of Robert A. Creamer, Joseph R. Lundy and Brian J. Red-
ding, Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society, Inc., A Risk Retention Group, to the American 
Bar Association Ethics 2000 Commission, AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commiss
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 123. Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to 
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Colgate Love, Update on Ethics 2000 Project and Summary of Recommendations to Date, 
PROF. LAW., Winter 2000, at 2, 8.  
 124. Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm Partners As Their Brothers’ Keepers, 96 KY. 
L. J. 231, 262-63 (2007). 
 125. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm 
Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 341 (2003). 
 126. Id. at 345.  
 127. Id. at 344-45; Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regula-
tion Debates, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 138-39 (2005). 
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responsibility is the most effective way to further organizational compliance 
with ethical rules.128  
Subsequently, Schneyer reconsidered his own proposal. While he did 
not disavow firm discipline, he found that it had proven ineffective in juris-
dictions that had adopted it and concluded that proactive enforcement was 
an even more important reform than merely adding reactive regulation at the 
firm level.129 Schneyer instead turned to a principles-based regulatory ap-
proach (although he did not use this terminology).130 Principles-based ap-
proaches contrast with the dominant command-and-control approach where 
regulators promulgate detailed rules.131 Although the distinction between 
principles based and command-and-control is not always clear,132 principles 
tend to be more general, flexible, and durable.133 Pierre Schlag notes that the 
“evaluative” nature of principles results in “plac[ing] the onus on the parties 
to work out and communicate their intentions completely and thorough-
ly.”134 Accordingly, Dan Awrey observes, principles-based regulations 
“promot[e]” the relational objective of “communication between drafters, 
decisionmakers, and those subject to their application.”135 Andrew Boon 
similarly notes that principles-based regulatory approaches “usually include 
intense dialogue between involved actors about the purpose and application 
of the principles, but the burden of interpretation and responsibility for 
achieving outcomes is on the regulated firm.”136 
The principles-based approach Schneyer recommended was imple-
mented in New South Wales, Australia.137 A similar version was later adopt-
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ed in the United Kingdom.138 Schneyer describes how “in 2001, when state 
legislation first permitted law firms to be organized as [incorporated legal 
practices],” Steve Mark, the Legal Services Commissioner of New South 
Wales, required firms that took advantage of limited liability to “develop an 
‘ethical infrastructure,’ which he defines as the ‘formal and informal man-
agement policies, procedures, and controls, work-team cultures, and habits 
of interaction . . . that support and encourage ethical behavior.”139 Rather 
than dictate specific ethical rules, the New South Wales approach identified 
ten broad objectives, including “timely provision of services; competent 
work practices to avoid negligence; . . . identification and resolution of con-
flicts of interest; . . . adequate means to ensure compliance with the notices, 
orders, and other requirements of regulatory authorities; [and] adequate 
supervision of the practice and staff.”140 Each limited liability firm must 
“designate at least one licensed NSW solicitor as a ‘legal practitioner direc-
tor’” as well as maintain and implement “‘appropriate management sys-
tems.’”141 Limited liability firms must complete a self-assessment and pre-
pare a report for the regulator, which may discuss the report with firm, 
“conduct a further review, and if necessary, formally audit the firm.”142 The 
goal of this process is “educating firms toward compliance.”143 Schneyer 
describes how one empirical study found that “the complaint rate for self-
assessed [limited liability firms] dropped two-thirds from their pre-
assessment rate.”144   
In the United Kingdom, the Legal Services Board decided to imple-
ment principles-based regulation in 2009.145 In implementing this approach, 
the Solicitors Regulatory Agency (“SRA”) recognized that it represented a 
shift from “identifying detailed rule breaches as an end in itself” to “as-
sessing the outcome for clients and the public interest.”146 The SRA’s pro-
posed outcome focused regulation includes:  
outcomes-focused regulatory requirements designed to give flexibility by avoiding 
unnecessary prescriptive rules on process, while giving clear guidance on what . . . 
firms must achieve for their clients; . . . an approach to the supervision of firms that 
helps firms achieve the right outcomes for clients, and that encourages firms to be 
open and honest . . . with [the SRA] . . . [and] enforcement action which is prompt, 
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effective, proportionate and creates a credible deterrent against failure to act in a 
principled manner.147   
Firm level regulation and the principles-based approaches as devel-
oped, for example, in both the United Kingdom and Australia offer the 
promise of a more relational way to regulate lawyers. Nonetheless, such 
relational regulatory regimes are vulnerable to a legal culture of autono-
mous self-interest. In that culture, lawyers and law firms would seek to ma-
nipulate the regulatory scheme as Holmesian bad men and women just as 
they would manipulate regulations focused on individuals and a rules-based 
approach. Indeed, John Flood has expressed the concern that large law firms 
are manipulating the United Kingdom’s principles-based regulatory system 
to promote their narrow self-interests. He has suggested that large law firms 
have sought to “exploit” the principles-based approach “to arrogate power 
to themselves” and “escape[] considerable, though not all, regulatory over-
sight.”148 Andrew Boon has raised another concern. He worries that under 
principles-based regulation “[f]irms may have a very different practice on a 
particular ethical issue than that of a neighbouring firm and divergence 
could magnify over time. The risk here is that the common ground of pro-
fessional ethics is lost, with each firm becoming an ‘ethical silo.’”149 Boon’s 
fear that legal services providers will no longer share ethical commitments 
and aspirations reflects an assumption that lawyers are autonomously fo-
cused and will only interact relationally with those with whom they must—
under principles-based regulation, the regulators, as opposed to their peers.  
In addition, certain goals of the United Kingdom regulations, such as 
permitting non-lawyers to own or deliver legal services, and including non-
lawyers in the regulation of legal services, have proven quite controver-
sial.150 Nonetheless, principles-based regulation does offer a relational strat-
egy for regulating lawyers within the existing United States framework that 
limits the ownership and delivery of legal services to lawyers and does not 
include non-lawyers in the regulation of lawyers. 
IV. A PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE RULES AND ROLES THROUGH 
A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO LAWYER REGULATION 
Firm level regulation and the New South-Wales and United Kingdom 
principles-based approaches offer an excellent foundation for a relational 
approach to regulation. These approaches recognize that relationships with-
in firms are essential to promoting ethical conduct and they create a recipro-
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cal relationship between regulators and those they regulate. Nonetheless, if 
the dominant culture of law practice remains autonomous self-interest, fur-
ther steps are necessary to promote an understanding of lawyers as relation-
ally self-interested actors with responsibility to the public good.  
These steps would explain and reinforce the perspective that lawyers 
and their clients exist within a web of relationships that includes not only 
the relationship between lawyer and client but also between each of them 
and their colleagues, adversaries, friends, families, and the actors in the le-
gal system. The first step would expressly recognize fostering relational 
self-interest as a goal of regulation. To strengthen this element, bar leaders 
and bar organizations should educate their members as to the relational na-
ture of legal practice and the value of relational, as opposed to autonomous, 
self-interest. 
Next, the regulatory framework should include a full range of rela-
tional dimensions. Instead of focusing exclusively on relationships between 
regulator and regulated, the regulatory approach should also focus on how 
law firms develop and implement their own ethical identities and plans. 
Firms, for example, should ensure that junior attorneys and staff are part of 
the processes of creating and implementing an ethical infrastructure. More-
over, the plans themselves should include a commitment to a relational ethic 
within the firm, including training, mentoring, and developing relationships 
of mutual respect. In developing their regulatory plans, law firms should 
consult with persons outside the firm who have relationships with the firm, 
including clients, members of the bar, judges, and members of the public. 
Additionally, in order to accommodate the perspective of relational self-
interest, law firms’ regulatory objectives should include aspirations, and not 
only command-and-control rules. The valuing of professional aspirations 
would emphasize that lawyers are more than Holmesian bad men and wom-
en.  
A relational perspective would also influence the substantive content 
of ethical principles. Instead of Miranda warnings that are too often intend-
ed to protect the autonomous self-interest of lawyers,151 ethical guidelines 
should view the lawyer-client relationship as fully relational and promote 
dialogue that would more likely include discussion of relational self-
interest.152 Lawyers’ relational self-interest would provide a solid grounding 
for commitment to professional values, including civility, the public good, 
pro bono, and civic leadership.153 
Last, regulators and bar associations should help create vehicles for 
small and solo practitioners to obtain the benefit of firm type regulation. 
  
 151. Supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text. 
 152. See, e.g., Wald, Attorney-Client Communications, supra note 89; Klinka & 
Pearce, supra note 106. 
 153. Pearce & Wald, Obligation of Lawyers, supra note 5. 
 Rethinking Lawyer Regulation 535 
They could, for example, organize through bar associations, inns of court, or 
their own groups, to establish affinity alliances of small and solo practices 
that would work together to develop their own regulatory plans, including 
ways to assist and monitor each other without breaching duties of confiden-
tiality and loyalty. 
But why would this program succeed in an environment where most 
lawyers understand their role in terms of autonomous self-interest? In reali-
ty, lawyers work and live in a web of relationships. Many lawyers will 
acknowledge that their success has resulted from relationships with clients, 
colleagues, and adversaries.154 Rainmakers at big firms, for example, often 
characterize their abilities to attract and maintain clients in relational 
terms.155 The vocabulary of relational self-interest will allow them to make 
sense of their achievements and their ethical obligations. Moreover, we 
suggest that many of those lawyers who express dissatisfaction with their 
careers are in fact unhappy because of the disjunction between the relational 
way they live their lives and the autonomous way they understand their 
work as lawyers.156 For them as well, the language of relational self-interest 
will enable them to see how their life and their work as lawyers are indeed 
harmonious.157 Adopting the framework of relational self-interest will not 
inevitably prevent either the silos of practice or the self-interested regulation 
that Boon and Flood fear,158 but it will promote a sense of community 
among lawyers and a commitment to the public good that will make those 
outcomes less likely. 
CONCLUSION 
Command-and-control regulation of lawyers through the Rules and the 
disciplinary system both assumes and reinforces the dominant conception of 
lawyers as neutral partisans—as Holmesian bad men and women.159 Not 
only is this approach ineffective in achieving its purported goal of regulato-
ry compliance, but it also undermines efforts to promote professional val-
ues, such as commitment to the public good.160  
A relational approach to lawyer regulation offers the potential for 
helping the community of lawyers move from the autonomous self-interest 
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perspective of the neutral partisan to that of the civics teacher who views 
society through the prism of relational self-interest. Instead of seeing our-
selves as, and teaching our clients and communities to understand them-
selves as, Holmesian bad men and women, we could teach the perspective 
of relational self-interest—that in determining what is good for me it is es-
sential that I consider what is good for my neighbor, colleague, customer, 
and community. The current regime of command-and-control lawyer regu-
lation impedes this vision. A principles-based approach that fully embraces 
a relational perspective, including firm level regulation, offers a realistic 
way to achieve this vision, including a robust commitment of lawyers to the 
public good. 
 
